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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN AGGREGATE CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
OTTO BUEHNER & COMPANY, a
corporation and PAUL BUEHNER,
Defendants and Respondents,

Case No.
13478

vs.

D. W. BRIMHALL,
Additional-Defendant on
Counterclaim and Cross-Complainant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
OTTO BUEHNER & COMPANY & PAUL BUEHNER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant has accurately stated the Nature of the
Case, its disposition and the Nature of Relief Sought.
However, Appellant's Statement of the Facts omits so
much that was critical and in fact, dispositive, that we
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have elected to refer to that evidence in detail. In order
to avoid tthe confusion sometimes given by a lawyer's
interpretation of the evidence we have referred frequently
to that evidence by question and answer.
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF THE PACTS
The case involves a basically simple fact situation.
The defendant Brimhall and Appellant American Aggregate Corporation had a joint interest in crushed white
quartzite which had remained substantially unsold for
three or four years. Both parties wanted to sell and Respondents wanted to buy. Brimhall signed a purchase
order agreement (Ex. 19-P in October of 1969). It provides for the sale of 4,000 tons plus of this rock (Ex. 19P ) . The 4,000 plus tons were delivered by Appellant and
Clark Tank Lines Co. beginning immediately after the
date of this purchase order. Appellant received, continuing through most of 1970, its portion of the money paid
Clark Tank Lines for hauing and also received payment
for its own hauling plus its share of the payment provided
for in Exhibit 19-P. What was not paid was tendered
into court.
The basic dispute arises over price. Appellant claims
that Brimhall was never authorized to agree to the terms
in Exhibit 19-P — which provided for $20.50 per ton. It
claims various larger amounts — from $25.50 to $29.50
to $35.00 per ton. It does not claim that Respondents
ever agreed to these larger amounts, but simply that these
were the only prices Brimhall was authorized to act upon.
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Appellant also claims that $20.50 per ton was below cost
and therefore, an illegal sale.
Respondents claim, and the court so found, that
Brimhall was not only authorized to act, but that Appellant ratified his acts.
Appellant, in an apparent effort to convince the court
that Respondents could not get this material from any
source other than its quarry, states that "milk-white
quartz" was specified, and then asserts that the only
other milk-white quartz was located in Virginia. There
was hearsay evidence that "Park Valley quartz," not
"milk-white quartz" was specified. Park Valley is an
area where white quartz is available in at least two other
quarries, one owned by Chidester, who testified in the
case, and one identified by Chidester as the Maxwell lease.
Both these quarries are contiguous to each other and the
American Aggregate quarry. The Maxwell quarry lies
just over the fence from Appellant's quarry. Not only
was this Park Valley quartz available, the undisputed
evidence is that Respondent had entered into an agreement with Chidester for the purchase of Park Valley
quartz prior to the date it entered into the agreement
with Appellant. The evidence from Chidester relating
to these facts is as follows:
Q. "Now, we have in evidence an
exhibit which is identified as Exhibit 3-P which
is represented to be a piece of quartz coming from
Style Crete quarry." (The question was corrected to identify the American Aggregate
quarry).
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Q. "You had a chance
that particular quartzite?"

to

observe
^
:

A. "Yes, I have."
Q. "Is that quartzite similar to
quartzite that you have in your quarry?"
r\.

JLOS.

the

• • •

Mr. Ashton: "Is the quartzite which is in
your quarry similar both as to quality and color
to the quartzite which is identified as Exhibit
3-P?"
A. "It is identical. Also identical with
the quartzite that is located in Mr. Maxwell's
lease, which is immediately contiguous to the
quartzite that you have" (T. 93-94).
Next it is suggested that Chidester could not supply
the quartz because his quarry was not opened up (Appellant's Brief, page 6). Chidester testified that he had the
option of supplying the material from either the Maxwell
lease or from his own lease, both of which contained material which is identical in color and quality with the
American Aggregate quartz and which was located in the
same geological formation. Not only had Chidester negotiated with Maxwell to take rock from his pit if he needed
to do so; he had agreed with Bingle Construction Company to quarry the material, with Schocker Construction
Co. to crush it and with Savage Brothers to do the hauling (T. 102). Exhibit 15-D is the agreement which Chidester signed with the Buehner Co. prior to the time Respondents entered into the agreement (Ex. 19-P).
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Next Appellant suggests that the Chidester agreement was a sham and a fraud becouse it was cancelled
shortly after Brimhall signed Exhibit 19-P (T. 103A).
(This Exhibit is also identified in Defendants Exhibit 5.
This fact should be kept in mind to avoid confusion. It
is referred to herein only as 19-P.)
The evidence on this point is clear and undisputed.
It shows that between two and four days after Chidester
signed his agreement he had a telephone call from Mr.
Buehner in which Buehner indicated that he felt that
he should get the material from Appellant. He said, "I
am very sorry. We'll pay." (Meaning expenses that
Chidester had incurred.) "I know that you have gone
to a lot of expense to run the details down." . . . "well
be happy to reimburse you for your expenses, but we
would like to get out of the purchase order." Chidester
then testified that "I conceded to let him out of his purchase" (T. 104, 105). This evidence supports Respondents' contention that Respondents relied on their agreement with Appellant prior to cancelling the contract with
Chidester. Appellant's reckless assertion that this Chidester contract was a fraud and a sham could only have
been on the theory that Chidester and Buehner lied.
There is absolutely no reason for reaching such a conclusion. Judge Hall saw the witnesses and judged their
credibility.
In dealing with the evidence relating to the critical
question of agency Appellant refers to several conversation which occurred between Brimhall and Reimann. From
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these selected conversations it would appear that Appellant had no knowledge that Brimhall had entered into
the agreement identified as 19-P. This, of course, is to
support Appellant's argument that Brimhall had no authority. The very important omitted conversations do
not support this conclusion. They are contrary to it. The
omitted conversations are as follows:
MR. BRIMHALL
Q. "When you talked to Mr. Buehner, now,
at the time that you saw Mr. Buehner and you
started some negotiating with him, did you keep
the Reimanns (American Aggregate) advised as
to what you were doing?"
A. "Yes . . . I worked between them."
Q. "And did you talk to the Reimanns and
tell them that you were negotiating this particular sale of this particular aggregate."
A. "Yes."
Q. "Did you tell them about your conversation with Mr. Buehner?"
A. "Yes." (This conversation related to
price.)
Q. "Now, when you signed the purchase
order, which is identified as Exhibit 19-P, did
you advise the Reimanns that you had signed
that purchase order?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "And did you tell them that you had
agreed upon a price of $20.50?"
A. "Yes."
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7
Q "Now, after you had., told then* that you
had signed this purchase order for $20.50 did you
then have a conversation with them about hauling this particular material?"

•. -

A. I went down to Style Crete and met 1J< in
and Rich and talked to them about it. Fold
them what I had done and I asked them — told
them that a certain tonnage had to be delivered
on a limited time. Winter was approaching and
I felt there needed to be additional help "
Q. "And when you told them what you had
done, did you tell them that you had agreed to
deliver the -amount of tonnage at the price of
$20.50 as shown by Exhibit P-19?
" - ••- • A

"Yes."

. './

, • : '' ..'

1

Q. "Now ,, how soon alter y ou told them
about this document that was signed (indicating
conversations relative to hauling the material to
the Buehner plant),

• •

A

"With them."

Q.

" I! i ss '

A

" A t t h a i • tiiiii s, •

Q

"N o"w , where was that conversa tionT'

'•' A ,

':'"'

. V . . V V- ':..•,/'''''';,•,....,.
':'"

!

11 • was out at 'the S. C planl ,"

Q. "And who was present besides yoursi ;lf?"'
A

"D >nam 1 Ri* i l l teimann • ( I1 252-253).

At the time of that conversation, according to Mr.
Biiiiihall, Don Reimann suggested that Brimhall secure
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bids for hauling the aggregate which was the subject of
the agreement identified in P-19.
The following testimony relates to a conversation
which occurred prior to the time the contract identified
as Exhibit P-19 was signed was between Paul Buehner
and Don Reimann.
A. "I told Mr. Don Reimann that we had a
purchase order with Mr. Chidester and that if
we were going to change it we had to know immediately because Mr. Chidester had to get the
aggregate out, and if he was — if he were going
to negotiate with him on the price of $20.50 they
had to know now. He said he didn't want to do
it and I said, can I work it out with Mr. Brimhall and he said yes, you go ahead . . . "
Q. "Now, did you have a conversation about
that time with Mr. Brimhall with reference to his
authority to act in this matter?"
A. "Yes." . . . (foundation material omitted). I told Mr. Brimhall that we had a purchase
order with Mr. Chidester to furnish the rock.
He, in turn, said, I have the rock crushed on the
mountain; we have had it there for three or four
years and I want to get rid of it. Would you
consider letting us furnish the rock for you and
he said yes. As a matter of fact, we will give you
a little bit more per ton because when you've got
it crushed and we may run into winter problems;
he said, we'll furnish it for that price." . . .
A. "Told me that he had an agreement
with the Reimanns to crush and process the rock
for sale; that they had a joint venture of some
kind — I don't know the detail of it, but he had
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authority to act in the selling of this aggregate.
He had the big, vested interest in the aggregate
and he had authority to sell it" (T. 553, 554, 555).
Appellant not only omits BrimhalTs testimony that
he advised Reimann of his agreement with Buehner (T.
252), it also omits any mention of the evidence relating
to the court's finding that Appellant "ratified and accepted the purchase agreement." This evidence, like the
other omission, is of the utmost importance and consisted
of the following:
First, immediately after the purchase order had been
signed and after Appellant had been advised of that fact,
Appellant started hauling aggregate to the Buehner plant
in Salt Lake City (T. 419-420). By January of 1970 over
1300 tons had been delivered. On January 9, D. W. Brimhall Company sent a statement to Buehners for 1,302.94
tons of Park Valley white quartz at $20.50 a ton. This
amounted to $26,710.27 (Ex. 49-P).
Not only did Appellant ship all that had been ordered
— it overshipped so that Respondents received more than
one thousand tons in excess of their requirements. There
is evidence in the record that Appellants did nothing to
prevent this overhaul; in fact they encouraged it. Mr.
Carlos Frank testified that late in 1970 a person identifying himself as Reimann called on the phone.
Q. "Did that person at that time tell you
not to deliver anymore?"
A. "No."
i
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Q. "Did he tell you to go on and continue
delivering?"
A. "Yes, and to make sure to have the bills
signed."
Q. "All right, and that was toward the latter part of the haul."
A. "Yes" (T. 194).
The testimony of the witness Christensen was even
more conclusive on this point and is as follows:
A. "Yes. Don Reimann was in my office on
many occasions."
*

#

*

*

Q. "Did he on the contrary tell you don't
haul rock to the Buehner Block Company?"
A. "He told me to keep hauling and get it
hauled. They wanted to get settled and get their
money."
Q. "Did he tell you that in the fall of
1969?"
A. "In mid-summer, 1970."
•

*

*

*

Q. "And did he tell you that as long as
you continued to haul, to your knowledge, to
continue hauling?"
A. "He told me to keep hauling to get the
rock hauled."
Q. "And did you keep hauling until you got
a stop order from down at the Buehner Block?"
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A. "We kept hauling rock into Buehner
Block until Mr. Allred said that was all the rock
they wanted."
Q. "And during any of that period of time
when you were making that hauling, did Mr. Don
Reimann in any of the frequent visits that he
had in your area ever tell you to quit hauling?"
A. "No, sir" (T. 78-79).
Long before this, on July 9, 1970, Richard Reimann
entered into an agreement with Brimhall wherein Brimhall would take $2.75 less a ton for his crushing charges
based upon a price of $20.50 per ton.
Q. "You finally, the two or three of you
got together, outside of the presence of my client,
Mr. Buehner, and decided that if the price was
$20.50 a ton he was going to get $2.75 taken off
of his $10 haulage fee?"
The Court: "$10 crushing fee."
The Witness: "Off his crushing fee."
Mr. Ashton: "Yes, Your Honor, I am sorry."
The Court: "All right."
Mr. Ashton:
Q. "$10 crushing fee and
screening fee or whatever he did?"
A. "That's right."
Q. "Was that agreed upon?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Was that agreed upon upon the basis
that the price was $20.50 a ton?"
A. "And 4,000 tons, yes" (T. 532).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FINDING THAT BRIMHALL WAS A "JOINT VENTURER" WITH
APPELLANT AND AS SUCH WAS AUTHORIZED TO ACT AS AN AGENT FOR APPELLANT IN ENTERING INTO THE PURCHASE ORDER AGREEMENT FOR THE
SALE OF AMERICAN AGGREGATE QUARTZITE.
We believe that the evidence fully supports the court
in making this finding. We have included the evidence
relating to this point in our Statement of the Facts, particularly that evidence which is quoted directly from the
record. We will refer briefly to it here.
Buehner, before the agreement was signed, talked
with Don Reimann albout purchasing the rock he needed
from Chidester. Reimann told him to deal with Brimhall,
work it out with Brimhall (T. 553). Brimhall said he
was authorized to act as an agent, and that he kept the
Reimanns advised of his negotiations (T. 252). Even the
Reimanns acknowledge that they knew Brimhall was
negotiating with Beuhner. They never advised Buehner
that Brimhall was not authorized, instead, on "the eve"
of signing the purchase order, and knowing that Chidester
was willing to sell at less than $20.50 per ton told Buehner
to work it out with Brimhall.
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By advising Respondents to work it out with Brimhall, Appellant bound itself even if Brimhall exceeded
his authority. It is so stated in the Restatement of the
Law, American Law Institute, Agency 2d, § 169 at page
396, as follows:
A disclosed or partially disclosed principal who
invites third persons to deal with the agent on
terms to be disclosed by the agent is subject to
liability upon contracts made with them by the
agent, although the terms are not within the
authority of the agent, unless they have notice
that the terms are not authorized.
Comment:
a. A principal who invites another to rely
upon the agent's statement as to the extent of
his authority is bound by the statement, although
false, as if made by himself, provided the other
has no reason to know it is false.
b. Whether or not the principal has manifested that an agent is authorized to disclose the
terms upon which he is to act is determined by
the reasonable interpretation of the principal's
manifestation to the other party.
Certainly, Respondents, who had just completed a
telephone conversation with Reimann relative to a purchase from Chidester at less than $20.50, could assume
that Brimhall had authority to meet that price when he
was told to work it out with Brimhall.
Appellant attempts to avoid the agency of Brimhall
by arguing in their Point I that Brimhall was not a joint
venturer with American Aggregate. On this point, as
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others, appellant omits the significant evidence which
supports the court's finding. Mr. Brimhall testified concerning an agreement he had with the Reimanns. It was
even reduced to writing and while not signed, expressed
what had been agreed upon. His testimony is as follows:
Q. "When did you finally get a point of
agreement so far as this proposition is concerned
— the year approximately?"
A. "Couldn't date it exactly, '65, '66, '67,
somewhere along in there."
Q. "I see. So it occurred over a period of
time; and did you finally reach an agreement
with the people at American Aggregate then to
move on to their property and to crush aggregate
there?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Prior to moving on to that property,
was there any discussion as to a written agreement setting forth the terms of your arrangements between you and them?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Was this written agreement prepared
by them, or was it prepared by you?"
A. "Jointly."
Q. "Who actually did the typing or the
final drafting of it, do you remember?"
A. "Mr. Paul Reimann."
Q. "And did you receive a copy of this —"

A. "Yes;
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Q. "— agreement? Do you have a copy of
it available now?"
A. "I am sure I have it, but I can't locate
it."
Q. "You have made a diligent search for
it?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Was this ever signed — did you ever
sign it?"
A. "No."
Q. "Did it set forth generally the terms of
your agreement?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Dd you recall the terms of that agreement?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Will you explain to the Court some of
the essential elements of that agreement?" . . .
A. "We had talked about an approximate
5,000 tons stockpile which would be a reasonable
quantity to consider and to have material ready
available for any market that might come along;
and we determined the sizes at that time but of
course I was talking to Buehner — Otto Buehner
Company and Rocky Mountain Aggregate from
Golden, Colorado, and Reimanns."
Q. "So you determined the sizes and then
you — what responsibility did you have then
to accumulating the stockpile, were you to crush
the material?"
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A. "I was to quarry it, crush it, and stockpile it in these various sizes."
Q. "Now, what other responsibility did you
have with regard to this agreement; who was going to sell the product, who was going to deliver
it and so forth."
A. "I understood we each had that responsibility to try to secure sales for it and that we
were all agents for it and —"
Q. "Did you plan on doing the hauling of
the material?"
A. "No. This was Reimann's responsibility.
Mine was strictly the quarrying and crushing
and—"
Q. "Did your agreement make any provision for any specific payments for one phase of
the operation as adverse to another; for instance,
were you to be paid for the crushing or were
they to be paid for the hauling, as adverse to —"
A. "We were each to be repaid for the respective job that we did."
Q. "All right. And how much were you to
be paid for the crushing?"
A. "$10 a ton."
Q. "And how much were they to be paid
for the hauling?"
A. "$8—"
Q. "Was a royalty discussed at that time?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "How much were you informed the royalty on the product was?"
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A. "$1.50."
Q. "And who was to pay the royalty?"
A. "It was to be paid out of the — overall
funds our price per ton."
Q. "Was there some provision for a division
of profit in the enterprise?"
A. "Yes" (T. 568-571).
Prior to giving this testimony Mr. Brimhall had been
called as an adverse witness by counsel for appellant. He
was examined by Mr. Reimann on this same subject
matter as follows:
Q. "Didn't you state that American Aggregate Corporation would have to do with the
selling?"
A. "I said that this was a joint venture."
Q. "Well, you told me that on that occasion —"
A. "You knew this."
Q. "How did I know it?"
A. "Because you drafted the agreement."
Q. "There was no agreement ever signed,
was there?"
A. "The draft — the agreement was drafted
and each of us were sent a copy."
Q. "You took all the copies away, didn't
you?"
A. "No. I didn't. You mailed my copy to
me by mail. I received it from the post office in
my mail box" (T. 212-213).
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Mr. Reimann then changed the subject and did not
return to it again. On cross examination, however, on the
same subject matter, Respondent elicited from Mr. Brimhall the following:
MR. ASHTON:
Q. "As I understand, you said that the
agreement was, which has been written up and
a copy sent to you, was that you would receive
$10 per ton when it was sold and they would
receive $8. Is that right — $8.00?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "And then the royalty would be paid?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "And then you would share in whatever
was left and split the profit, if any, is that right?"
A. "Right."
Q. "And that was the agreement which was
written up; and did you understand that to be
the agreement between you?"
A. "Yes."
MR. REIMANN:
" Just a moment. I object to that. They have
said the agreement was not signed so it's incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. There was
no such document ever signed."
MR. ASHTON:
Q. "Had they agreed with you to those
terms, regardless of whether the document was
signed?"
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MR. REIMANN:
"Just a moment. We object to that. The
witness has already testified that he sold his interest in this and was getting $10 per ton. And
he stated what all he had to do to get it."
THE COURT:
"And the profit after that, is that what he
said?"
MR. REIMANN:
"His deposition is —"
THE COURT:
"His testimony here today was that he was
going to share in some profits" (T. 250-251).
The omitted evidence thus clearly supports the court's
finding that the Reimanns and Brimhall were acting for
each other in a joint enterprise and that BrimhalTs acts
were not only authorized but were ratified and approved
by the Reimanns. Disregarding this evidence, Appellant
launches into an involved legal argument with supporting
cases and statutes asserting that as a matter of law there
was not a joint enterprise. We submit that these statutes
and cases have no application to the facts in this case as
there was an agreement to share profits and as the Stilwell
case relied upon by Appellant holds, (Stilwell v. Trutanich, 3 Cal. Rptr. 285, 178 C. A. 2d 614; "The law implies
a provision that losses are to be shared among the parties
in the same proportion as profits were to have been divided."
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Appellant cites Section 48-1-3, U. C. A., 1953, as a
definition of joint venture. That section defines a partnership. Whether a joint venture is the same as a partnership or not need not be argued. Both parties were
co-owners of the crushed rock, both having an interest
by reason of a quarry ownership and a crushing operation
and by reason of their agreement to share the profits of
the sale of the crushed material. The fact that they were
not joint owners in the quarry is immaterial.
This Court in at least two cases, Bates v. Simpson,
121 U. 165, 239 P. 2d 749, and Shutte & Sons v. Broadbent, 24 U. 2d 415, 473 P. 2d 885, has defined a joint venture. In the Shutte case the Court cited the Bates case
with approval and then quoted from Realty Development
Co. v. Felt, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P. 2d 898, concerning the
requirements for a joint venture, as follows:
1. "There must be a joint interest in the
property."
2. "There must be agreements, express or
implied, to share in the profits or losses of the
venture."
3. "There must be actions and conduct
showing cooperation in the project."
There is evidence in this case supporting all three requirements. That evidence is referred to herein. The fact
that this evidence is ignored by Appellant does not mean
that the trial court did so.
Appellant has misinterpreted 48-1-6, U. C. A., 1953,
and has omitted to point out as provided therein that:
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Every partner is an agent of the partnership for
the purpose of its business, and the act of every
partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any instrument for apparently
carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partnership of which he is a member, binds the
partnership, unless the partner so acting has in
fact no authority to act for the partnership in the
particular matter and the person with whom he
is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has
no such authority.
Next, Appellant on page 23 of its brief, ignoring the
evidence, writes:
There was no joint venture because Brimhall
was to receive a fixed price of $10 a ton when
the aggregate was sold and plaintiff collected
the money, and he was not to share any loss with
plaintiff. Consequently, there was no agency.
However, if there had been a joint venture, the
purchase order would have had to be signed in
the name of the joint venture in order to bind
plaintiff, not in the name of Brimhall alone.
The fact that American Aggregate's name was not
on the Purchase Order was argued to the court below.
There, as here, the court was referred to, see 149, American Law Institute Restatement of the Law Second, page
365, wherein it is written:
A disclosed or partially disclosed principal is
subject to liability upon an authorized contract
in writing, if not negotiable or sealed, although
it purports to be the contract of the agent, un-
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less the principal is excluded as a party by the
terms of the instrument or by the agreement
of the parties.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF RATIFIED THE PURCHASE ORDER
AGREEMENT.
Evidence has been referred to in Respondents' Statement of the Facts, particularly in quotations from the
record indicating evidence which the court relied on to
prove a ratification. On the 29th of May, 1970, long after
the Purchase Order had been signed, Mr. Buehner had
a conversation with Mr. Don Reimann. Buehner testified, after refreshing his recollection from a diary which
he kept regularly at that time. His testimony from that
diary was as follows:
Q. "Now, will you tell the Court after refreshing your recollection which you have already done, what he said in that conversation
and what was said by you."
A. "He said in that conversation — he said
he would like to meet to settle the price on the
aggregate."
Q. "And was this after the meeting of
course of April or May of 1970?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "And what, if anything, did you say?"
A. "Glad to meet."
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Q. "And did you ever meet with him after
that t i m e r
A. "Had another phone call."
Q. "Now, have you told us all that transpired in that particular phone call?"
A. "That's all I had reference to in the
diary."
Q. "Did you have another phone call, looking at your diary on June the 3rd of 1970?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "And was it made at the time?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "And of course it's in your handwriting?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Now, after having refreshed your recollection of that conversation, will you tell the
Court who that conversation was with?"
A. "Was with Don Reimann."
Q. "And were you looking at the same
place where the conversation occurred by telephone?"
A. "By telephone."
Q. "At your office?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "Now, will you tell the Court in your
own words what was said by you and what was
said by Mr. Reimann — Don Reimann?"
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A. "He called and said we would accept the
price on the aggregate which has been discussed,
which was $20.50. And he also said that he would
like to have us help him with the use of our models and molds on the oxen at the reduced price."
*

*

*

*

A. "And we — I agreed to reduce the price
for the use of the oxen and the molds — that is
the molds and the models at that time; and we
came to the agreement then that he would have
those at the reduced price and we agreed on the
price for the aggregate."
Q. "Now, did you subsequently produce
those oxen — the molds for the oxen."
A. "Yes."
Q. "And did he use them?"
A. "Yes."
*

*

*

*

Q. "Now, all right. Did you ever hear any
more about the aggregate price until the lawsuit
was filed against you?"
A. "No" (T. 557-559).
Appellant not only argues contrary to the evidence,
as pointed out herein that there was a ratification, he
also argues that such ratification by his clients was illegal
because it violated the "Unfair Practices Act" and that
the sale was below Appellant's costs and, therefore, illegal.
Without arguing the cost question, which indeed is sub
ject to argument (Appellant did not take into consideration the profit made by itself and Brimhall from crushing
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and hauling), we submit that Appellant has no standing
in this case to apply the statute. The court found that
the agreement providing for the sale of aggregate was not
only authorized by Appellant but that Appellant also
ratified Brimhall's acts. From these findings it follows,
even though Appellant refuses to accept the conclusion,
that Appellant was a seller and not a buyer or a third
party competitor. As seller, it is not seeking to recover
on a contract; as prohibited by the act it is attempting
to avoid its own contract. The contract, as found by the
court, is not a secret one between Brimhall and Respondents, it is an authorized and ratified contract between
Appellant and Brimhall and Respondents.
The effect of what Appellant is trying to do is to
convince this court that a seller can enter into a contract
below cost and after delivering the full amount of the
product, repudiate its agreement and recover on the
theory that its violation of the law excuses its performance. The "below cost" provision of the "Unfair Practices
Act" is not to protect sellers who enter into an agreement
to sell below cost, but to protect the public and competitors who are damaged thereby.
While Respondents have urged that this statute is
not applicable to a seller who seeks to repudiate his own
contract, there is still a further reason why the statute
is not applicable. Counsel's point is made in a recent
case, Pacific Engineering and Production Company v.
Kerr-McGee, et al.} decided by Judge Hoffman sitting
as a United States District Judge in Salt Lake City in
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February of this year. The case is not yet printed but
will be by the time this case is argued. While we appreciate that this is not an appellate court decision, it is
well-reasoned and refers to cases which have been determined and to authorities which have considered the
question. It is, therefore, quoted at some length as follows:
"PE's final claim is that a number of AMPOT's
sales below cost were in violation of Section 135-7 of the Utah Unfair Practices Act. The pertinent part of this section reads as follows:
"It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer
to sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as defined
in this act with the intent and purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor, impairs and prevents
fair competition, injures public welfare, is unfair
competition contrary to public policy and the
policy of this act and is declared to be a violation
of this act."
"Even assuming that Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation offered or sold its A/P below cost within
the State of Utah, we feel that the Utah statute
is clearly inapplicable. There are many reasons
for our belief; however, our discussion will focus
only on the fact that the statute applies to retailers and wholesalers and not to manufacturers."
"Although PE has tried to persuade us that the
Utah legislature intended the word wholesalers
to be given a broad interpretation, we are con-
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•**>•:.. vinced otherwise. In Burt v. Woolsulate, 106
Utah 156, 146 P. 2d 203, 205, the Utah Supreme
Court discussed the reasons for the enactment
of the various unfair practices acts. The court
stated that 'the immediate stimuli for the enactment of such acts were in part the rapid rise of
chain stores and in part the general sharpening
of competitive pratiees under pressure of the depression.'
Quoting from an article entitled Trohibiting
Price Discrimination and Sales Below Cost: The
State Unfair Practices Acts,' which appeared in
32 111. Law Rev. 816, the court stated:
"One of the practices aimed at by these (unfair
practices acts) statutes is that, common in chain
stores, of selling at lower prices in one locality
than in another and making up losses incurred
by profits in other stores. Even more important
in the application of anti-discrimination statutes
today is the prevention of discrimination sales by
manufacturers to customers with unusually
strong bargaining power who can force large price
concessions. * * *
"On the whole the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Unfair Practices Acts seem best fitted to
reach manufacturers and producers who, in the
past have placed certain retail buyers in preferred competitive positions by giving them special rebates or other price favors. Enforcement
at this point can be doubly effective under the
'Little Robinson-Patman Acts' which penalize
not only the seller but the buyer who knowingly
induces or receives discrimination in price."
Although the word "manufacturers" is used, it is
clear that the purpose of the act was to protect the small
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independent merchant. It is equally clear that the below
cost provision should not be applied to manufacturers.
This latter point is set forth in the law review article
mentioned above.
In this article, the following is stated:
"While the wording of the sales below cost provisions in most of the statutes is broad enough in
scope to include those engaged in business in all
its various phases, the types of businesses to
which laws of this sort can be successfully applied are necessarily limited. The acts are inadequate for application to manufacturer's sales
because of the complex factors involved in determining cost."
The article further states:
"A few of the acts do not extend the sales below
cost provisions to manufacturers. In view of
the fact that the most undesirable practices of
manufacturers are eliminated by the anti-discrimination sections, it seems proper that they
should be exempt from the sales below cost provisions."
The product which was involved in the Kerr-McGee
case was manufactured at ThiokoPs plant in Utah. The
product involved in the instant case was quarried and
crushed, in other words, manufactured in Utah.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FINDING THAT AP-
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PELLANT WAS NOT TO BE PAID MORE
THAN $20.50 PER TON FOR ALL THE AGGREGATE DELIVERED.
Appellant's argument is as follows:
Plaintiff never executed the fraudulent and illegal
Brimhall Purchase Order." But instead, "that it would
refrain from suing if defendants complied with four specified conditions; but defendants never complied with any
of them." Appellant thus goes from one erroneous assumption to another which grows to monstrous proportions and which becomes difficult to answer simply because it is based upon false premises.
First, the court found that Appellant did execute the
contract through its agent and that it did ratify the contract by shipping the aggregate and receiving payment.
Respondents always stood on that contract (T. 555-556)
and the court found that that contract was executed and
ratified. The contract provided for 4000 tons and, in
addition, that in the event additional material is needed
"it will be provided at the same price." Exhibit P-19.
Not only was additional material supplied, it was,
as indicated herein, over-supplied, because Don Reimann
told Christensen "to keep hauling and get it hauled. They
wanted to get settled and get their money" (T. 78-79).
Because of this over-haul, Respondents received approximately 1000 tons more than they wanted. Rather than
dispute with Appellant on this matter they conceded at
the close of the evidence they would pay for the over-de-
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livered amount and tendered into the court the sum due
and owing as though they had ordered the same. It seems
strange that Appellant would complain of this over-delivery which was caused! by its own enthusiasm. The court
may not have been unmindful of the fact that at the time
the agreement was entered into it was estimated that
there were approximately 5000 tons of crushed material
which neither Appellant nor Brimhall had been able to
sell for three or four years. The sale in this case disposed
of that entire amount.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Respondents respectfully submit that the Court should sustain the findings
and judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By
Clifford L. Ashton

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY
DEC 6

1975

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J. Reuben Clark Law Sdiool

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

